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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE RIGHTS OF A MEXICAN CONCUBINE
UNDER ARIZONA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
Resumen
El caso de Fidel Ocoa Urquijo (fallecido), Rosa Elda VelAsquez
(supuesta viuda) y otros, v. Reidhead Enterprises and-State Compen-
sation Fund, decidido en 1.981 por la Comisi6n Industrial de
Arizona discute si, a consecuencia de la muerte de un nacional
mexicano ocurrida en un accidente de trabajo mientras legalmente
desempefiaba sus deberes para un empleador de Arizona, la con-
cubina sobreviviente tiene derecho, bajo las leyes de la repfiblica de
Mxico, a reclamar las prestaciones o compensaciones laborales en
su caracter de viuda, de acuerdo con la ley sobre compensaciones
laborales del estado de Arizona. De conformidad con la ley mexi-
cana, la concubina sobreviviente de una relaci6n de concubinato
tiene derecho alas compensaciones como si hubiera estado realmente
casada con el concubino al momento de su muerte. Bastndose
6nicamente en el texto de los certificados de nacimiento de los do
hijos del de cuyus (nacidos de diferentes madres) los cuales describen
al mayor de ellos como hijo "legitimo" y al hijo de la reclamante
como "natural," eljuez de la oficina administrativa dedujo que el
fallecido habia estado casado previamente en forma legal y no
encontr6 prueba documental de la disoluci6n de tal matrimonio.
Como para el derecho mexicano no puede existir una relaci6n de
concubinato si coetdneamente existe un matrimonio legalmente
celebrado, el juez decidi6 que no podia existir una subsecuente
relaci6n de concubinato entre la reclamante y el fallecido en la
reptblica de Mexico. Por ello, aqudlla no podia considerarse con
derecho a ninguna compensaci6n laboral. El juez adicionalmente
analiz6 dos argumentos: En primer lugar concluy6 que la concubina
no podia igualarse a una "viuda o esposa" de un trabajadorfallecido
bajo la ley de Arizona, no obstante que, para los efectos de la ley
laboral, el estado de Arizona reconoce como valida una uni6n libre
legal (esto es, un matrimonio no formalizado pero reconocido con
base en la existencia de un acuerdo entre las partes de vivir como
marido y mujer y denominado "common law marriage'), si en la
jurisdicci6n en donde ella se dd se la reconoce tambien como vtiida.
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En segundo lugar determin6 que considerar tal concubinato como
vidlido atentaria contra laspoliticas generales del estado de Arizona
porque 6l carece de la estabilidad tanto del martimonio como de la
uni6n libre legal o "common law marriage" y debido a que en el
derecho mexicano una relaci6n de concubinato puede terminarse a
voluntad de cualquiera de laspartes. Como el caso nofue apelado
m~is all, del nivel del fallo del juez administrativo, este tipo de
situaciones permanecen sin respuesta definitiva en el derecho del
estado de Arizona.
Abstract
The case of Fidel Ochoa Urquijo (deceased), Rosa Elda Velasquez
(alleged widow) et al. v. Reidhead Enterprises and State Compensa-
tion Fund, decided by the Industrial Commission ofArizona in 1981,
considers whether a woman, recognized as a surviving concubine
under the laws of the Republic of Mexico, is entitled to widow's
benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of
Arizona (the Arizona Act) upon the death of her Mexican national
"husband, " when that death arose out of and in the course of his legal
employment with an Arizona employer. Under Mexican law, a
surviving concubine of an existing concubinage is entitled to receive
the same survival benefits as a woman legally married to the deceased
at the, time of death. Based solely upon the wording of the birth
certificates of the deceased's two children (born of different mothers)
which described the eldest as "legitimate "and the claimant's child as
"natural, " the administrative law judge ruled that the deceased was
presumed to be married to the mother of the eldest child andfound no
documentary proof of the dissolution of this marriage. Since by
Mexican law a state of concubinacy cannot arise if there is a prior
existing marriage, the judge ruled that there was no subsequent, valid
concubinage between the claimant and the deceased in the Republic
of Mexico; the claimant was, therefore, entitled to no benefits. The
judge considered two further arguments in the case. First, he
concluded that a Mexican concubine could not be equated with a
"widow, spouse or wife" of a deceased employee under the Arizona
Act, even though a common-law marriage, valid in the jurisdiction
where consummated, is recognized as valid in Arizona for the
purposes of the Arizona Act. Secondly, it was determined that a valid
concubinage offends the public policy of the State of Arizona,
primarily because it lacks the stability of both a ceremonial marriage
and a recognized common-law marriage since, underMexican law, a
concubinage is terminable at the will of either of the parties. Because
this case was not appealed beyond the level of the administrative law
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judge, these issues are both unresolved and unreported in the State of
Arizona.
The recent case of Fidel Ochoa Urquijo (deceased), Rosa Elda
Velasquez (alleged widow) et al. v. Reidhead Enterprises and State
Compensation Fund' (Fidel Ochoa Urquijo), brought before the
Industrial Commission of Arizona, presents a unique problem. The
issue is whether a woman, recognized as a surviving concubine under
the laws of the Republic of Mexico, is entitled to widow's benefits
under the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of Arizona (the
Arizona Act) upon the death of her Mexican national "husband,"
when that death arose out of and in the course of his legal employment
with an Arizona employer.
The purpose of this article is to promote discussion rather than to
offer an answer because, unfortunately, the problem is both unresolved
and unreported. 2
Equally unfortunate is that the writer of this article has been unable
to find, in a less than exhaustive research, any Arizona or other
reported American case dealing with this topic.3 This is somewhat
startling because it would seem that the situation presented should not
be unusual in the field of workmen's compensation considering
the number of Mexican nationals who are legally employed in the
United States. 4
The facts of this case are rather simple. The deceased, Fidel 0.
Urquijo, was employed in the logging industry in the State of Arizona
1. Fidel Ochoa Urquijo v. Reidhead Enterprises and State Compensation Fund,
Industrial Commission ofArizona (I.C.A.) ClaimNo. 999-03-2354, State Compensa-
tion Fund (S.C.F.) Carrier No. 79-15478 (May 29, 1981).
2. It was fully expected that the losing party would take recourse to the appellate
process. However, no appeal was filed, and the decision of the Industrial Commission
Administrative Law Judge was allowed to become final. Such decisions are not
reported, and, therefore, the information is available only in the Industrial Commission
claim file in Phoenix, Arizona.
3. Eds. note: Upon subsequent research by this editorial staff, no reported cases
were found dealing with Mexican concubinage as it applies to workmen's compensa-
tion in the United States. In Henderson v. Travelers Insurance Co., 354 So. 2d 1031
(La. 1978), the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that a dependent concubine of a
workman fatally injured at work may recover workmen's compensation benefits on the
basis that she is a dependent member of his family and her recovery will not infringe
upon any share of compensation benefits to which statutorily entitled claimants (wife,
child, parent) are preferentially entitled. However, the claimant in this case was a
"concubine" under definition of Louisiana law, which does not recognize the status of a
"common-law wife."
4. Illegal aliens are not considered for the purpose of this article, although that
subject would also make an interesting topic in the area of workmen's compensation
law.
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at the time he and several other employees were killed when a truck in
which they were riding on the job went out of control and crashed. The
first claim for benefits was made by the deceased's mother but was
later withdrawn, and, in its place, a claim was made by Rosa Velasquez
on the grounds that she was entitled to "widow's benefits" as a legal
concubine of Fidel under Mexican law. She also made a claim for
benefits on behalf of her daughter, Claudia Irasema Ochoa Velasquez.
Another claim was presented by one Antonia Estrada on behalf of her
daughter, Minerva Aide Ochoa Estrada. Antonia Estrada alleged that
she was the Jegal concubine of the deceased at the time the child,
Minerva, was born, although Antonia did not make a claim on behalf of
herself as an alleged widow. Based upon valid documentary proof from
the Republic of Mexico that both children, Claudia and Minerva, were
fathered by the deceased, the State Compensation Fund (the insurer)
stipulated that the children were entitled to survivors' benefits under
the Axizona Act.' But the insurer denied the alleged widow's claim by
Rosa.
The matter eventually went to hearing before Honorable William E.
Smith, Administrative Law Judge of the Arizona Industrial Commis-
sion, based upon pleadings and documents contained in the Industrial
Commission claim file and the testimony of two witnesses, both expert
in Mexican law, Roberto Ramirez, Mexican Consul in Phoenix,
Arizona, and Boris Kozolchyk, Professor of Law at the University of
Arizona. The three major issues for the consideration of the judge
were:
(a) Was there a valid concubinage between Rosa and the deceased
under Mexican law?
(b) If there was a valid concubinage, would the applicant be entitled
to workmen's compensation widow's benefits under the wording
of the pertinent Arizona statute, A.R.S. § 23-1046?
(c) Assuming the answers to the foregoing were both yes, do the
principles of a valid concubinacy, as the equivalent of a valid
marriage, offend the public policy of the State of Arizona?
No Valid Concubinage Under Mexican Law
This aspect of the case, merely of passing interest to the main thrust
of this article, has an independent interest related to the use of
5. Other than for the purposes of trial strategy, this stipulation was unnecessary
because Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 23-1064(3) conclusively presumes that
a natural or adopted child under the age of eighteen is totally dependent for support
upon the deceased employee. However, at this point it must be emphasized that this use
of the word "natural child" is to be distinguished from the same term in the Mexican
law, which will be discussed later in this article.
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documentary evidence from the Republic of Mexico and the laws of
interpreting such documents to establish a presumptive marriage in
Mexico without the use of a Certificate of Marriage.
Both expert witnesses testified that, pursuant to Mexican law, a
concubinacy relationship must be established by the cohabitation of a
man and woman as a "free union" for a period of five years, or a lesser
period if a child is born of the union. From affidavits of witnesses
submitted into evidence, it was established that the legally required
"time period" was met in the present case to establish a concubinacy
relationship. In an existing concubinage, the surviving person is
entitled, by Mexican law, to receive the same survival benefits as
though that person had been the legally married spouse ofthe deceased
at the time of death. According to the expert witnesses' testimony, the
purpose of the law is to provide against the de facto spouse being left
without a means of support.
It was the contention of the insurer that there was no concubinage
because the deceased had been previously married and there was no
evidence that the marriage had been dissolved under the laws of
Mexico. It is axiomatic in the Republic of Mexico that there can be no
concubinage, entitling a concubine to legal rights, if there is an existing
marriage.6
The State Compensation Fund argued that there was sufficient
evidence to show the existence of a prior marriage despite the absence
of a marriage certificate. This contention was based solely on the
wording of the two birth certificates that were introduced by the
claimants to establish the paternity of the children of the deceased. The
birth certificate relating to the child, Minerva, daughter of Antonia,
indicated that Antonia was domiciled at the time with her "husband"
and described the child, Minerva, as the "legitimate" child of that
relationship; whereas the birth certificate for Claudia, the child of the
alleged widow and claimant Rosa, was described in the birth certificate
as the "natural" child of that relationship. Both of the experts in the law
of Mexico defined the term "legitimate child" as meaning a child born
of a valid, formalized Mexican marriage and that the designation
"natural child" refers to a child born of a concubinacy or less.
Furthermore, Mr. Ramirez testified that Mexican law requires that
formal, solemnized marriage certificates or documentation be fur-
nished at the time a birth certificate is prepared by the Civil Registry to
6. CODIGO CIVIL DEL ESTADO DE CHIHUAHUA: LEYES Y CODIGOS DE MEXICO 285
(Editorial Porrua 1978). See also THE CIVIL CODE FOR THE FEDERAL DISTRICT AND
TERRITORIES OF MEXICO [CIVIL CODE] 327 (0. Schoenrich & C.M. Sandoval
trans. 1950) (model for the Chihuahua Code). Eds. note: For amore recent edition, see
THE MEXICAN CIVIL CODE (M.W. Gordon trans. 1980).
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enable a child to be designated as a "legitimate" child of a marital
relationship. To rebut this point, the claimant relied upon the affidavits
of three witnesses who lived in the deceased's home town of Ciudad
Madera, State of Chihuahua, which stated that the deceased had never
at any time been married and that the child, Claudia, was the child of
the relationship between the deceased and Rosa. These affidavits also
indicated that Rosa and the deceased resided together for about four
years, which would have established a valid concubinacy under the
laws of Mexico pursuant to article 1635 of the 1928 Civil Code.7
The claimant also filed a written, but unverified, letter from Antonia
which disclaimed that she had ever been married to the deceased,
Fidel, or to anyone else.8
The defense presented the averment of the mother of the deceased
in her original claim for benefits which stated that her son had never
been married and had no children at all. This was to cast doubt on the
knowledge or veracity of the affiants, but the course of the hearing
determined that this was not necessary.
The fact that was decisive on this issue, however, was the
immutable character of the assertion of the birth certificates that the
first child, Minerva, was the "legitimate" child of a valid, ceremonial
marriage whereas the second child, Claudia, was the "natural"
offspring of a lesser relationship. That, taken together with the fact
that there was no documentary proof of the dissolution of the
presumptive previous marriage, impelled the administrative lawjudge
to rule that there could have been no subsequent, valid concubinage in
the Republic of Mexico. Both expert witnesses testified that a state of
concubinacy cannot arise if there is a prior existing marriage.
Professor Kozolchyk further testified that since the only documents
avail able to the Industrial Commission were the two birth certificates,
they must be accepted as an established fact regarding "legitimate"
versus "natural" childhood under the terms of article 34, Civil Code
of Sonora, Mexico. That article reads:
The civil status of persons is only proven with the
certifications issued by the Registry. No other document,
or means of proof is admissable to prove civil status,
except the cases expressly exempted by law.9
7. CIVIL CODE, supra note 5.
8. Such a document is of no avail in Arizona. It has been held that where there are
two possible putative wives a disavowal by one does not qualify the other as the widow.
Gamez v. Industrial Commission, 114 Ariz. 179,559 P.2d 1094 (Ct. App. 1976) rev.
denied, (Feb. 8, 1977). See also Wilson v. Wilson, 139 Neb. 153,296 N.W. 766,786
(1941).
9. CvI CODE OF SONOPLA, MEXIco art. 134 (1968) (the exceptions are not
applicable in the instant case) (the birth of the child Minerva Aide was recorded in the
State of Sonora, Mexico).
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At this point the claim of the alleged concubine would have been
defeated, but the administrative law judge considered the other
arguments ostensibly on the assumption that the Arizona Court of
Appeals or the Arizona Supreme Court might have viewed the first
issue differently; a more likely explanation is that he wished to place
the main issue squarely before the appellate courts.
A Valid Mexican Concubinacy Does Not Entitle
the Survivor to Compensation Benefits Under
the Arizona Statute
The applicable Arizona statute (A.R.S. § 23-1046) setting forth
those dependents entitled to workmen's compensation benefits for a
survivor uses but three phrases relevant to a claim by a concubine,
"surviving spouse," "widow or widower" and "husband or wife."' 10
The judge must determine whether the claimant fits into one of these
categories, thus entitling her to compensation benefits as a survivor
under the statute.
Although the status of concubinage has its roots in the era of the
ancient Roman civil law, it has never attained the dignity of a valid,
ceremonial marriage or even a valid, common-law marriage. Its
existence is somewhere between those recognized relationships and
the occasional "one-night stand" or even a continuous, but illicit,
relationship." Not even in the Republic of Mexico is concubinage
afforded the dignity or full rights of a valid, ceremonial marriage.
12
Based upon a literal interpretation of A.R.S. § 23-1046, the
administrative law judge in Fidel Ochoa Urquijo came to the
conclusion that a Mexican concubine could not be equated with a
"widow, spouse or wife" or a deceased employee. The status of the
Mexican concubine, the judge further determined, was not affected by
the Arizona case law that a ceremonial or common-law marriage valid
in the jurisdiction where it was consummated is recognized as valid for
the purposes of the Arizona Workmen's Compensation Act.'3 There-
10. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN § 23-1046. (1981) The statute also includes parents and
brothers and sisters under certain conditions. This is irrelevant to this claim. At one
time the statute had a "catch-all" clause for other types of dependency, but this was
declared to be unconstitutional in Moore v. Industrial Commission, 24 Ariz. App. 324,
538 P. 2d 411 (1975) and State Compensation Fund v. DeLaFuente, 18 Ariz. App.
246, 501 P.2d 422 (1972), rev. denied, 109 Ariz. 439, 511 P.2d 621 (1973).
11. See 52 Am. JuR. 2D MARRIAGE § 8 (1970).
12. I. GALINDO GARFIAS, DERECHO CIVIL 452 (1973). Professor Galindo Garfias
after having previously referred to concubinage as a "peculiar method" of forming a
family, states that the drafters of the legislation relating to concubinage considered
marriage to be exalted. Id. at 451-52.
13. Gamez, 114 Ariz. 179, 559 P.2d 1094; Mission Insurance Company v.
Industrial Commission, 114 Ariz. 170, 559 P.2d 1085 (Ct. App. 1976).
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fore, he denied the claim for benefits on this ground. Thejudge's initial
determination, that a concubine is not entitled to benefits because
semantically she is not a statutory widow or wife, gives rise to the
query of why such an equation is not possible.
Stated in a way other than by strict semantics, the issue is why
should a concubine who has lived with the deceased, depended upon
him for their mutual livelihood, and borne him a child not be entitled
to benefits as a widow when her putative "husband" is killed in an
accident arising out of his employment in the State of Arizona, or for
that matter in any other state in the United States. The surviving
concubine usually has some measure of dependency on the deceased
for material support. If the concubine's relationship is recognized in
the Republic of Mexico, albeit on a "second-class" basis, is she not in
the same moral, legal and economic condition as her American
counterpart who establishes her marriage under the common law in
those jurisdictions where it is recognized? Both survivors commenced
their relationship on an illicit basis. Both have presumably dedicated
a portion of their lives to carrying out the same functions as a
ceremonial wife, even to the extent of bearing a child or children for
their mate. Consequently, if that mate loses his life while working for a
foreign employer, should not the surviving concubine be entitled to
the same benefits as a wife? Since even the American common-law
wife has attained the same status as a ceremonial wife under the
Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of Arizona, why not her
Mexican counterpart?
The response to these questions by the defendant insurance carrier
was that the concept of concubinage was contrary to the public policy
of the State of Arizona, even though Arizona recognizes the status of
common-law marriage if it was effectuated in a foreign jurisdiction
that sanctions such relationships.
A Valid Concubinage Offends the Public
Policy of the State of Arizona
From earlier times it has been the tendency of the courts of the
United States to use the term "concubine" synonymously with
"misl:ress,"' 4 and therefore, for example, refuse to consider a concu-
14. The synonymous usage of the terms probably comes from a much earlier time,
e.g., Succession of Stevenson, 158 So. 33 (1934); Keener v. Grand Lodge, A.O.U.W.,
38 Mo. App. 543 (1889). But the best example of the early misconception of
concubinacy as it is used in Mexico is the case of West v. Grand Lodge, A.O.U.W. of
Texas, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 471, 37 S.W. 966 (1896), where the female companion was
referred to as a "concubine" despite the fact that the male was a married man. As set
forth previously, this is totally inconsistent with the Mexican Law.
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bine as being included as a "dependent" for the purposes of life
insurance policies. This result would be reached despite the fact of
actual economic dependency. Such an analogy distorts the problem at
hand since the Mexican "concubine" has more legal validity than the
American "mistress."
The Arizona Court of Appeals has stated that "[t]he concept of
marriage under the workmen's compensation statutes is not special,
but follows the ordinary domestic relations law of this state." 5 Thus,
for the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act, there are only
two forms of a man-woman relationship recognized in the State of
Arizona, i.e., the valid, ceremonial marriage and the common-law
marriage that is commenced and consummated under the laws of a
jurisdiction which recognizes such marriage. The "casual" or "loose"
relationship between man and woman not sanctioned by law does not
qualify for benefits, despite the fact that such a relationship may
involve all of the indicia of a marriage, including sexual relations, the
birth of children and economic dependency. The use of the term
"casual" and "loose" is intentional because it is the writer's own
opinion that its lack of formality is one of the most important reasons
why a valid Mexican concubinage cannot legally rise to the level of a
valid marriage unless and until there is legislative and judicial
acceptance of the American version of the same status, i.e., man and
mistress.
Even in those states that do recognize common-law and putative
marriages, it has been held that a concubinage gives to the concubine
no property interest, except that portion accumulated by the concu-
bine's own labor and industry. 16 But this latter statement again
incorporates the American version of a "concubine." The American
status of concubine is held to a much lesser standard than that of
Mexico; this is exemplified in the definition, given by the Louisiana
Supreme Court, of the state of "concubinage" as being "the act or
practice of cohabiting in sexual intercourse without the authority of
law or legal marriage."' 17
Yet cohabitation as a concubine is within the authority of the law in
the Republic of Mexico, and certain economic benefits can flow from
such status. Should not that status be equated to a lawful American
common-law marriage, at least from a financial point of view, as a
matter of comity?
15. Gamez, 114 Ariz. at 181, 559 P.2d at 1096 (citations omitted).
16. Sparrow v. Sparrow, 231 La. 966,93 So.2d 232 (1957); Timmons v. Timmons,
222 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
17. Gauffv. Johnson, 161 La. 975, 978, 109 So. 782, 783 (1926).
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But public policy has avery strong influence on legislation and legal
decisions in the United States. Consider the example of first cousins,
domiciled in the State of Arizona, who went to the State of New
Mexico and there were joined in a valid New Mexico marriage despite
their blood relationship. Thereafter, they returned to the State of
Arizona and lived together a number of years as husband and wife.
Despite the validity of this marriage in New Mexico, the Arizona
Supreme Court struck it down with the statement that "marriages
performed outside these states which offend a strong public policy of
the state of domicile will not be recognized as valid in the domiciliary
state." 8
But why would a concubinage, legally recognized in a foreign
jurisdiction, offend the strong public policy of a state (not a domi-
ciliary state) wherein only certain monetary rights are attempted to be
enforced for the loss of a working man's earnings? The argument is
because a concubinage by its very nature lacks the stability of both a
ceremonial marriage and a recognized common-law marriage.
Even a common-law marriage obtains the attribute of indissolu-
bility and, therefore, stability. American authority is that a valid
common-law marriage, once judicially determined as such, is as
sacrosanct as a ceremonial marriage. 19 On the other hand, under
Mexican law a concubinage is terminable at the will of either of the
parties. In fact, a man can "stack" one concubinacy on top of the
other simply by entering into a relationship with a woman, bringing it
to civil fruition by the passage of time or the birth of children and,
thereafter, voluntarily abandoning it and commencing a new one.
Legally, he could continue this procedure ad infinitum. As stated by
the Mexican Supreme Court, "The concubinacy is a free union of
greater or lesser duration....",0
Professor Ignacio Galindo Garfias, a faculty member of the
National University of Mexico Law School and a leading authority on
the Mexican Civil Code, exalts the status of marriage in Mexico but
recognizes the popular trend of concubinage as "a peculiar method of
forming a family."'21 Professor Galindo Garfias also underlines the
18. In Re Mortenson's Estate, 83 Ariz. 87, 90, 316 P.2d 1106, 1108 (1957).
19. See Roy v. Industrial Commission, 97 Ariz. 98, 397 P.2d 211 (1964);
Kolombatovich v. Magma Copper co., 43 Ariz. 314, 30 P.2d 832 (1934); In Re
Winder's Estate, 98 Ca.2d 78,219 P.2d 18 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950); Catlett v. Chestnut,
107 Fla. 498, 146 So. 241 (1933); Craddock's Case, 310 Mass. 116, 37 N.E.2d 508
(1941); 52 AM. JUR. 2D MARRIAGE § 53 (1970).
20. Amuparo Directo 825/68, Francisco Garcia Koyoc, 3a Sala, Septima Epoca,
Vol. 6, reported and extracted in COMPILACION MAYO DEL SEMANARIO JUDICIAL DE
LA FEDERACION, Septima Epoca, vol. 1-6, Civil, 1969 at 128-29 (1972).
2 1. GALINDO GARFIAS, supra note 11, at 451.
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above statement by pointing out that marriage is governed by the
principles of indissolubility, except by legally sanctioned means,
whereas concubinacy is subject to exparte extinction at any time by
the will of either of the parties without the intervention of the law. 22
On the other hand, Frederick S. Staatz, a Washington attorney who
researched the legal status of concubinage in Latin America while a
comparative law student at the University of Arizona College of Law,
urges that one should not confuse concubinacy with a mere adulterous
liaison (which contrarily seems to be the inclination of American
courts) becau.e the Mexican Supreme Court has pointed out that one
principle of condubinage is "fidelity. '23 Yet, in the same context he
cites a Mexican Sdpreme Court decision that summarily rejected a
concubine's claim because she had voluntarily "broken off" with her
mate a few months before his death. This result was reached despite
the fact that she had spent many "faithful" years with the deceased. 24
Conclusion
The author is of the opinion that the decision in Gamez v.
Industrial Commission25 clearly points to the position that the
Arizona appellate courts would have taken had the matter of Fidel
Ochoa Urquijo been presented to them. In Gamez, the deceased
workman and the claimant were married by a priest in Mexico but
failed to comply with the Mexican Civil Code and never entered into
an American civil marriage when they took up residence in Tucson,
Arizona. She contended she would have been entitled to certain
benefits under Mexican law. The Arizona court of Appeals termed
this contention "irrelevant" and continued,
We are not herein concerned with Mexican workmen's
compensation law. The only question of Mexican law
which is involved is whether petitioner contracted a valid
legal marriage there. The point at issue on this appeal is
whether petitioner is entitled to benefits as a widow under
Arizona law, and to do so she must qualify as having been
married to the decedent .... 26
Granted there was no valid Mexican concubinage established, so the
case is not exactly in point, but it certainly is indicative.
22. Id. at 451-52.
23. F.S. STAATZ, CONCUBINAGE IN LATIN AMERICA 64 (1973) (unpublished
manuscript available in University of Arizona College of Law Library).
24. Id. at 64-165.
25. Gamez, 114 Ariz. 179, 559 P.2d 1094.
26. Id. 114 Ariz. 183, 559 P.2d at 1098.
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There is also the public policy issue. Despite the fleeting quality of
many modern marriages and the advent of "palimony" and "gali-
mony, ' '2 7 it is this author's opinion that the courts are not ready to
equate concubinage with marriage, no matter how valid the concu-
binage in the jurisdiction where it is recognized. Concubinage carries
with it the specter of dissolution at whim, and the Law, being a
"jealous mistress," is not about to permit a marriage to be created or
destroyed without its intervention. In the meantime, concubinage
probably will be viewed in the same light as the marriage in In Re
Duncan's Estate28 which was based upon an antenuptial agreement
providing for an uncontested divorce at the option of the husband,
where the court rather vehemently stated,
The contract is [utterly] void. It is against public policy.
The marriage relation lies at the foundation of our civiliza-
tion. Marriage promotes public and private morals, and
advances the well-being of society and social order. The
sacred character of the marriage relation is indissoluble,
except as authorized by legislative will and by the solemn
judgment of a court. It cannot be annulled by contract, or at
the pleasure of the parties. 29
-John A. Flood*
27. This article has intentionally refrained from involving these recent American
cases since those decisions alone would make a lengthy but interesting article on the
same subject being considered here.
28. In Re Duncan's Estate, 87 Colo. 149, 285 Pac. 757, 70 A.L.R. 824 (1930).
29. Id. 87 colo. at 152, 285 Pac. at 758, 70 A.L.R. at 826.
*Member, Legal Dept., Arizona State Compensation Fund; L.L.B., St. John's
University, Jamaica, New York (1960).
